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The Paradox of Poor Political Governance in 
Solomon Islands
Poor political governance in Solomon Islands 
appears paradoxical. The country is not well 
governed: in 2012 it ranked in the bottom 25 per  
cent of all countries globally in World Bank 
measures of government effectiveness and regu-
latory quality (World Bank 2013). As in most 
states, its politicians are a major determinant of 
governance: they manage or mismanage ministries; 
they legislate or fail to legislate; they deal with, or 
cut deals with, extractive industries. In the Solomons 
case, with occasional exceptions, governance 
indicators suggest they do not do this well.
Yet Solomon Islands is also a democracy. It 
holds regular, and relatively free and fair national 
elections. And here lies the paradox: few Solomon 
Islanders are happy with the performance of 
their political rulers, yet they continue to vote for 
candidates who govern the country poorly. 
Local Voting
Figure 1 is derived from responses to a question 
asked in the 2011 People’s Survey (ANU 
Enterprise 2011). In it, voters were asked why 
they voted for the candidate they voted for in 
the 2010 national elections. To create the chart, 
I have removed responses that are too broad to 
be interpretable (such as ‘Because I liked the 
candidate’) and I have focused on people’s first 
responses to the question (they were allowed  
up to three; results change little when based  
on all responses). 
There is much of potential interest in  
the chart, but most significant for the  
paradox described above is that only two  
of the responses — ‘Party/Policies’ and  
‘Good vision for country’ (together totalling 
3.55 per cent) — pertain to national politics. All 
of the others, to the extent they reveal spatial 
preferences, suggest voters choose primarily 
on the basis of local considerations. My own 
fieldwork revealed a similar story. Almost all 
of my interviewees (voters, community leaders, 
candidates, and past and present MPs) described 
voting in search of personal or local benefits.
The Vicious Cycle of Local Voting
Voting locally is a sensible act in a poorly governed 
state. In Solomon Islands, the government is both 
weak and cumbersome; its reach into most people’s 
lives is minimal and, because national political 
movements are non-existent, the outcome of 
political contestation in any individual electorate 
is decoupled from the potential to change this. 
Under such circumstances, the only way elections 
are likely to bring improvements for voters is if they 
vote for a candidate who will help them or their 
community directly. This is the logic of local voting.
Figure 1: ‘Why did you vote for the candidate 
you voted for?’
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Yet by voting this way, voters contribute to 
poor governance. MPs who serve the country well 
are not rewarded, and MPs who perform poorly 
nationally are not punished. It is local performance 
that counts electorally. This gives MPs an incentive 
to focus on the local at the expense of the national, 
which, in turn, plays a major role in perpetuating 
the problem of poor political governance in 
Solomon Islands. It is a vicious cycle: people vote 
locally because the state is weak, yet by voting 
locally they help keep it that way.
Escaping the Vicious Cycle
Solomon Islanders are not alone in their local 
voting behaviour. This sort of voting — part of 
what political scientists call clientelism — can be 
found across the developing world, as well as in 
the histories (and sometimes even the present) of 
OECD countries. Clearly, as the non-clientelist 
politics of most OECD states shows, it is possible 
for countries to evolve out of clientelism, although 
political scientists are divided on how such escapes 
occur. Fukuyama (2013) provides a good summary 
of potential explanations. Of these, the avenue for 
transformation that would seem to hold the most 
promise for Solomon Islands is the rise of national-
level social movements. Plausibly, such movements 
might be able to inspire voters into believing that 
national-level change is at stake in elections, while 
at the same time providing them with a means of 
collective action capable of bringing such change 
about. This, it needs to be emphasised, is far from 
guaranteed, although the recent rise of a new 
generation of social movements in Solomon Islands 
(for now still small and Honiara-based) offers 
some cause for optimism here.
For actors such as donors, there are two key 
lessons. First, politics is central in determining 
governance in Solomon Islands. The fundamental 
causes of poor governance are not technical 
or capacity-based, but stem instead from the 
electoral incentives politicians face. Second, the 
problems of politics in Solomon Islands are in an 
equilibrium state of sorts (the vicious cycle). They 
will not be easily shifted, least of all by external 
actors, although outside entities can still play an 
important role in holding key institutions together, 
and, through this, in providing space for domestic 
change to occur. 
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